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Abstract 
This research examines the use of financial mechanisms that simultaneously impose controls and 
facilitate blame avoidance by public office-holders.  A qualitative historical examination is used to 
examine legislation designed to prevent Radio Caroline, a pirate radio station, from broadcasting 
into Britain in the 1960s.  Radio Caroline made a mockery of the British Government’s power to 
manage radio through a monopolist, the British Broadcasting Corporation.  In addition, Radio 
Caroline played the type of rock music the British Government sought to supress as representing 
the undesirable side of youth culture.  This research examines the suppression of Radio Caroline 
through the Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 and the legislative scapegoating of 
Radio Caroline by targeting its revenue-earning potential.  Inter-generational conflict underpinned 
the legislative scapegoating of Radio Caroline.  This research demonstrates how financial controls 
can mask scapegoating and blame avoidance strategies by governments.  
Keywords 
Blame avoidance, government accounting, pirate radio, Radio Caroline, scapegoating. 
Introduction 
Why don't you all f-fade away (Talkin' 'bout my generation) 
And don't try to dig what we all s-s-say (Talkin' 'bout my generation) 
I'm not trying to cause a big s-s-sensation (Talkin' 'bout my generation) 
I'm just talkin' 'bout my g-g-g-generation (Talkin' 'bout my generation) 
                             (Lyrics of “My Generation” by The Who, released in 1965 (Townshend, 1965)) 
 
Although many of the actions of public office-holders are framed to include blame avoidance 
strategies (Hood, 2002), extant accounting research has failed to consider whether governments 
can incorporate blame avoidance strategies into mechanisms and processes of financial control.  
Prior research in disciplines other than accounting has viewed the control mechanisms of 
government separately from strategies adopted by public office-holders to avoid blame (Bucher, 
1957; Bezes and Le Lidec, 2015; Hansson, 2015; Hood et al., 2009) so it has ignored the potential 
of financial mechanisms to control while facilitating blame avoidance.  By failing to consider 
whether financial control mechanisms can simultaneously serve public office-holder interests by 
allowing them to escape or deflect blame associated with the consequences of their decisions, we 
risk underestimating the potential of financial mechanisms to serve the objectives of government, 
which include both control objectives and objectives of political preservation that are served by 
blame avoiding strategies.  The purpose of this research is to examine the potential of government 
financial control mechanisms to facilitate blame avoidance.  Extant literature underpinning a duality 
of control and blame avoidance is outlined in the following section.  We illustrate the simultaneous 
use of financial mechanisms to control while facilitating government blame avoidance by 
considering the Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 (hereafter “the legislation”).  The 
British Government promulgated this legislation to prevent a radio station, Radio Caroline, from 
earning revenue although it purported to introduce control mechanisms to facilitate maritime safety.  
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The legislation allowed the British Government to simultaneously impose financial controls on 
Radio Caroline that led to its demise while minimising the blame for this outcome. 
During the 1960s, the British Broadcasting Corporation (hereafter “BBC”) had a monopoly over 
British radio broadcasting.  United States Armed Forces Radio and some continental European 
radio broadcasters, such as Radio Normandie and Radio Luxembourg, could be received in certain 
parts of Britain, but these stations did not infringe the terms of the monopoly because they were 
licensed by other countries.  Hence, they are not relevant to this research.  The BBC’s 
broadcasting monopoly was originally given by Royal Charter.  The monopoly was later ratified and 
expanded by the British Government to include sole responsibility for determining the content of 
British radio broadcasting, including music selections.  The BBC did not have sole responsibility for 
the format of the music it played.  A contractual agreement with the Musicians’ Union, known as the 
Needletime Agreement, limited the amount of recorded music played by BBC radio stations each 
week.  This contract was designed to ensure the BBC played primarily live music, ensuring 
continued employment for professional musicians.  In 1960 the Needletime Agreement limited the 
amount of recorded music played by BBC radio stations to a total of 28 hours per week per radio 
station with a maximum of five hours per day, decreasing in 1964 to 20 hours per week (Parker, 
2004). 
The legislation was enacted to prevent broadcasting by radio stations located outside British 
legislative jurisdiction but established with the express purpose of broadcasting into Britain.  At the 
time of its enactment, Radio Caroline was the only radio station in this category.  Radio Caroline 
was not a party to the Needletime Agreement.  By circumventing the BBC’s monopoly of British 
Radio airwaves and the strictures of the Needletime Agreement, its presence on British radio 
airwaves made a mockery of the British Government’s ability to maintain a monopoly over radio 
broadcasting via the BBC.   
Radio Caroline was one of a group of radio stations established to circumvent British broadcasting 
legislation.  The British media adopted the term “pirate stations” to describe these radio stations.  
This was a reference to their unauthorised use of British radio airwaves, the risk-taking nature of 
their business and the control challenge they presented to the BBC and the British Government. 
Our research focuses on Radio Caroline because it was the most popular pirate station with the 
largest listening audience.  Although not expressly named in the legislation, Radio Caroline was 
acknowledged in Parliamentary debates by the British Government to be the target of the 
legislation because, when promulgated, Radio Caroline was the only pirate radio station continuing 
to broadcast into Britain: other pirate stations had ceased operating.  The movie The boat that 
rocked (Curtis, 2009) is very loosely based on Radio Caroline.  Radio Caroline operated from two 
ships equipped with radio broadcasting equipment.  These ships broadcast into Britain from 
locations outside British territorial waters.  The media referred to the ships as pirate ships. 
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Although we prefer historical accuracy to fiction, there have been some difficulties ensuring 
accuracy in this research.  Published histories of Radio Caroline are primarily by former Radio 
Caroline disc jockeys so are replete with bias and nostalgia.  We have used Parliamentary debates 
in this research but recognise that public office-holders seeking to avoid blame may have been 
selective in their statements to Parliament.  Despite our concerns about selective memories and 
statements, we believe the benefit in using an historical example outweighs the problems that 
would accrue from a contemporary study of blame avoidance by public office-holders: a 
contemporary example would raise political sensitivities that might obscure the issues yet it would 
still be subject to the selective use of language by all parties, whereas a measure of objectivity is 
possible with an historical example. 
After summarising the literature that scaffolded our thinking, we provide a brief background to 
pirate radio in 1960s Britain and the circumstances that led the British Government to enact the 
legislation.  We then outline the financial control mechanisms in the legislation and how the 
legislation simultaneously served to control Radio Caroline while helping the British Government 
avoid blame for its actions against Radio Caroline.  Our example demonstrates that unless we 
examine closely the use by public office-holders of financial control mechanisms, we may focus on 
the control aspects but subtler aspects of these mechanisms, such as their potential for blame 
avoidance, may remain hidden. 
Literature review 
This research examines the use of financial mechanisms by the British Government to 
simultaneously control while enabling public office-holders to avoid blame for the adverse impact of 
its control regime.  Adoption by public-office-holders of strategies that seek to deflect or reduce 
blame for unpopular or adverse government decisions is a recurring theme in extant literature 
(Hood et al., 2001; Hood et al., 2009; Hood, 2010).  The use of blame avoidance strategies by 
public office-holders has been connected with the desire for re-election (Weaver, 1986), attempts 
to minimise financial risks (Black, 2006), ensure political survival (McGraw, 1990) or lessen public 
resistance to unpopular government decisions (Hood et al., 2001).  Both public sector institutions 
and private sector organisations can be defined by how they handle blame (Sutcliffe and Weick, 
2007).  Public office-holders use blame avoidance strategies and techniques so frequently that 
Hood (2010) described blame avoidance as a political and bureaucratic imperative.  Despite their 
prevalence, our understanding of blame avoidance techniques in the public sector is limited; this 
had led to calls for additional research to enhance our understanding of practices used to avoid 
blame (Coates and Tognazzini, 2012; Bezes and Le Lidec, 2015; Black, 2006; Maestas et al., 
2008). 
The political mechanisms that underpin blame avoidance can be complicated as public office-
holders seek to deflect perceived and real blame for losses imposed, or decisions to which they 
have acquiesced, while simultaneously receiving for credits for benefits they have given (Weaver, 
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1986).  Blame avoidance permeates the structures, language and operations of public sector 
decision-making (Hood, 2010; Weaver, 1986).  The adverse consequences of blame create 
pressure for office-holders to make decisions seem neutral and innocuous, or altruistic (Maestas et 
al., 2008).  Weaver (1986) identified that the desire by public office-holders to avoid blame can 
exceed the desire to be credited for “good” decisions.  This may indicate the self-protection 
underpins the desire not to be blamed.  It may be that potential consequences to public office-
holders of being blamed has made them particularly sensitive: extant literature has recognised a 
strong negativity bias unique to public office-holders (Boyne et al., 2009; Gelders et al., 2008) 
whereby negative information has more influence on decision-making than equally strong positive 
information (Hood, 2007). 
The predilection for blame avoidance by public office-holders has been described as distinguishing 
the public sector from the private sector and viewed as a reflection of different attitudes towards the 
risk of error between the public and private sectors (Cialdini et al., 2006).  Blame avoidance 
strategies in the private sector may remain hidden from public gaze but this does not mean private 
sector is less risk averse than the pubic sector.  Government decisions and their consequences are 
more likely to play out in a public arena, although this does not necessarily make it easier to 
identify blame avoidance strategies used by public office-holders. 
The use of multiple, complicated blame avoidance strategies has become an entrenched feature of 
government decision-making processes so they are no longer readily identifiable as blame 
avoidance strategies (Hood, 2007).  Hood (2010) identified three types of strategies frequently 
used in public sector decision-making to avoid blame.  First, presentational strategies involve the 
use of argument, spin or stage management to shape public impression (Hood, 2007).  Second, 
agency strategies use the complexity of government agency relationships and agency structures, 
including complex lines of responsibility and rotating staff, to make it unclear who is responsible for 
a government decision (Hood et al., 2009).  Third, policy strategies that use the routines and 
processes of the public sector to minimise individual or institutional liability (Weaver, 1986).  Hood 
(2010) noted that the complex nature of blame avoidance in public decision-making may lead to 
other blame avoidance strategies used by public office-holders that fall outside the three identified 
groups, and some blame avoidance strategies fit within more than one group so classifying blame 
avoidance strategies can be problematic.  There is also the danger of seeing a blame avoidance 
strategy where none exists.  For instance, lack of accounting transparency can be a blame 
avoidance strategy (Hood, 2007) or simply reflect the inherent obfuscation of accounting 
(Rutherford, 2003; Connolly and Hyndman, 2006). 
There is considerable research on the use of accounting as a mechanism of control (Alawattage 
and Wickramasinghe, 2008; Walker, 2008; Walker and Carnegie, 2007) but it is separate from the 
extant accounting research on blame avoidance, where the focus has been on the denial of 
accountability (Mattli and Buthe, 2005; Maestas et al., 2008) and has primarily focused on blame 
avoidance following the release of adverse financial results (Charbonneau and Bellavance, 2012).  
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There is a paucity of accounting research on blame avoidance for financial consequences of 
decisions.  This reflects the construction of accounting as a legitimating activity whereas blame 
avoidance is seen as a strategy to rebut or avoid a perceived threat to legitimacy (Weaver, 1986).   
The construction of accounting as a legitimating activity comes from a political economy 
perspective that views accounting documents as legitimising the economic and political actions of 
organisations (Magness, 2006).  This view of accounting has recognised four broad responses to 
perceived threats to legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1993).  First, methods, goals 
or outputs may be changed to conform to external expectations.  This will include explaining why 
certain actions or changes were necessary.  Second, methods, goals or outputs may be left 
unchanged.  This will require explanation about why change was unnecessary.  Third, 
organisations may attempt to alter societal perceptions by associating themselves with symbols 
that have high legitimacy.  Fourth, organisations may attempt to align societal expectations with the 
organisation’s methods, goals and outputs.   
Despite its prominence in extant accounting research (Masrani and McKiernan, 2011; O’Donovan, 
2002; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000), we prefer not to use legitimacy theory to understand the use of 
accounting in blame avoidance because the legitimising role of accounting is unclear (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989) and to confine accounting to a legitimising role is to take a narrow view of accounting 
with which we are not in agreement (Magness, 2006).  We view accounting as acting and acted 
upon by society (Hopwood, 1983; Burchell et al., 1980) but recognise that the power that is derived 
from political leadership can make for an unequal exchange of knowledge between society and 
public office-holders so any attempt to enhance our understanding of blame avoidance by public 
office-holders must be tempered by recognising their power to obfuscate both explanations of their 
actions and their use of accounting information. 
Background 
This section explains the background to pirate radio in 1960s Britain, focusing on Radio Caroline.  
We discuss why pirate radio was a threat to the British Government, why Radio Caroline proved 
particularly problematic for the British Government and the circumstances that led the British 
Government to enact the legislation. 
The history of Radio Caroline is well-documented (Lodge, 2010; Lodge, 2002; Conway, 2009; 
France Radio Club, 2010; Humphries, 2003; Johns, 2010; Noakes, 1984; Radio Caroline, 2011; 
Venmore-Rowland, 1967).  It was set up as a private company by band manager Ronan O’Rahilly 
to provide airplay for the music of the rock bands he managed and the recorded music of other 
rock musicians including The Beatles, The Kinks, The Rolling Stones, Eric Burden and the 
Animals, and The Yardbirds (Chapman, 1992; Lodge, 2010).  The BBC limited the airplay time for 
rock music because of the Needletime Agreement and its programming choices (Lodge, 2010). 
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Named after the daughter of the President of the United States, Caroline Kennedy, Radio Caroline, 
played non-stop rock music.  Although its target market was British youth, within months of going to 
air, Radio Caroline had a larger listening audience than BBC radio (Humphries, 2003) even though 
under the Wireless Telegraphy Act (UK) 1949, everyone who listened to a pirate broadcast was 
breaking the law.  Although the BBC retained the legal monopoly of the airwaves, Radio Caroline 
had, in reality, broken the BBC’s monopoly of Britain’s radio airwaves. 
Radio Caroline successfully adopted a funding model based on commercial advertising, with paid 
advertisements and jingles.  Its advertisers provided its entire revenue stream (Venmore-Rowland, 
1967) and included Pfizer Inc. (Listerine mouthwash), Phensic (headache powders), 
GlaxoSmithKline (Ribena blackcurrant fruit drink), Bulova Watch Company (luxury watches), 
Weetabix and Kelloggs (breakfast cereal), Golden Wonder (peanuts), Halex (toothbrushes), 
Cadburys, Frys and Rowntrees (confectionery), Heinz (food products) and British Petroleum Ltd, 
which was 51 percent owned by the British Government (Gilmore, 1967; The pirate radio hall of 
fame, 2013).  An advertising-based model was not a new funding model for radio: it was used in 
the United States and Continental Europe (Craig, 1990). 
However, this funding model had been viewed as unviable financially for the BBC by a British 
Government inquiry into radio broadcasting in the 1930s, on the advice of Sir Charles Higham, the 
BBC’s chief executive officer at the time of the inquiry (Barnard, 2002).  Although Higham had 
made a fortune from advertising, he argued successfully that maintaining licence-based funding for 
the BBC ensured listeners were entertained but advertisement-based funding would only tell 
people what to buy (Higham, 1933).  Two subsequent Royal Commissions agreed that the BBC’s 
funding model should not include advertising revenue (Beveridge, 1951; Pilkington, 1962), a 
position strongly supported by the British Government in the early 1960s (Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, 1962; Barnard, 2002).  Instead, the BBC was funded from annual licence fees 
(£1 5/- in 1967) paid under the Wireless Telegraphy Act (UK) 1904 whenever a household had one 
or more radio receivers (White, 2003; The Guardian, 2005; Radiolicence.org.uk, 2016).  These 
radio receivers could be tuned to receive BBC radio or pirate radio stations.  Thus, if someone 
chose to listen to pirate radio rather than BBC radio, it had no financial impact on BBC revenue.  If 
someone purchased a radio receiver expressly to listen to pirate radio stations, the BBC benefited 
financially from the licence fee. 
The BBC’s absolute control of radio programming choices was only possible with British 
Government sanction, which was given without reservation at each Government inquiry into 
broadcasting (Pilkington, 1962; Barnard, 2002).  The Pilkington Royal Commission perversely 
found that it was in the public’s best interest for the BBC to control all aspects of radio broadcasting 
in Britain because it would be “patronizing and arrogant” to assume radio listeners knew what was 
in their best interest (Pilkington, 1962: paragraph 48).  The British Government saw the BBC as the 
front-line defence against “excessive triviality” in radio broadcasting, a term it did not define 
(Postmaster General, 1962: , para. 34).  The British Government agreed with the Pilkington 
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Commission that only the BBC had the expertise to determine what was in the best interests of the 
listening public and hence, unfettered BBC control of programming content was justified (Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, 1962). 
The 1960s were a time of enormous social change in Britain precipitated, in part, by a youth 
rebellion against the establishment: the establishment included government and those perceived to 
be aligned with government (Marwick, 2000).  There was disillusionment with post-war social 
reforms and dissatisfaction with Britain’s shifting political and economic direction (Savage, 2010).  
Simultaneous with the rise of youth culture and rock music were threats from the forces of anti-
colonialism, disestablishmentarianism, and the republican and home-rule movements (Henn et al., 
2002).  The rise of a youth culture in 1960s Britain has been described as a cultural revolution 
evidenced most prominently through music and fashion but viewed by establishment Britain as a 
disturbing and threatening counter-culture (Henn et al., 2002).  The British government wanted to 
suppress the rising youth culture because it was seen as subversive (Sinfield, 2007). 
The term “pirate radio” was reinforced in the imagination of the British public by media reports of 
wild parties aboard Radio Caroline, Radio Caroline’s reported disregard for British broadcasting 
controls and certain actions by its staff.  The most infamous action involved Radio Caroline staff 
seizing a rival station.  Radio City broadcast from a disused fort built during the Second World War 
and located sixty-eight nautical miles off the coast of Kent.  Allegedly, Radio Caroline planned a 
friendly takeover of Radio City and provided it with new transmission equipment that reached a 
larger geographic audience.  Radio City reneged when new British legislation made Radio City’s 
main operations illegal (Edwards, 1966)  Shareholders decided to liquidate Radio City to avoid 
prosecution but a dispute arose over ownership of its transmission equipment.  Radio Caroline 
claimed the equipment was given on condition the takeover occurred but Radio City claimed the 
equipment was given unconditionally.  The dispute was essentially financial: the equipment was a 
valuable asset that could be sold to give shareholders a return on Radio City’s liquidation.  In a 
bizarre incident, Major Oliver Smedley of Radio Caroline led a boarding party that entered Radio 
City’s sea-fort and took the crystal from the transmitter, making it unusable.  He left some members 
of his boarding party at the fort to prevent Radio City staff access.  In response, Reg Calvert of 
Radio City threatened to use nerve gas to remove the remaining boarding party.  The following 
day, Calvert visited Smedley at his home.  An altercation ensued in which Smedley fatally shot 
Calvert.  Smedley, arguing self-defence, was acquitted of murder and manslaughter and was 
awarded 250 guineas towards his legal costs (Johns, 2010).  This incident reinforced British media 
portrayals of Radio Caroline as subversive (Donnelly, 2005) and prompted the British Government 
to renew legislative measures to suppress all pirate radio stations (Johns, 2010).  Following the 
Radio City incidents, the British Government used a different approach in Parliamentary debate to 
attack Radio Caroline.  With the benefit of Parliamentary privilege, it started suggesting Radio 
Caroline was mismanaged financially, although there was no evidence to support this claim: 
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When the circumstances of the financing and management of Radio Caroline and of Radio City 
are investigated, we shall find that some respectable newspapers, notably the Financial Times, 
have been weaving a romantic web around some operations which will not look too well when 
the light of examination is brought to bear upon them (Jenkins, 1966). 
This unsubstantiated attack on Radio Caroline’s financial probity would appear to be a last resort 
approach to discrediting a station popular with the media and public.  Radio announcer on pirate 
station Radio London, David Cash, would later say that the British government “needed something 
heavy like drugs or murder (to legislate against pirate radio) …(W)e gave them murder” (France 
Radio Club, 2010).  By its actions, Radio Caroline staff contributed to the impression of a 
dangerous and subversive youth culture: to the British Government, pirate radio represented the 
youth culture it sought to suppress. 
Unless some urgent action is taken, it seems to me that this country may shortly be ringed by 
an armada of ships, pumping out a continuous programme of "pop" music from dawn to dusk, 
despite the interests and rights of many other people (Aberdare, 1964). 
Suppression of pirate radio represented control of youth culture (Donnelly, 2005; Marwick, 2000; 
Wakeman, 2003).  Pirate radio stations such as Radio Caroline threatened the status quo, flouting 
the power of the BBC and British Government and making the British Government’s decision-
making appear outmoded and irrelevant (Wedgwood Benn, 1966).  In Parliament, the British 
Government discussed “the inherent dangers of allowing such a station (as Radio Caroline) to 
continue” (Mason, 1964).  Lord Morrison stated that pirate radio was supported by “people who are 
interested in the development of commercial radio – the same kind of vested interest and 
Parliamentary pressure lobby that acted in respect of commercial television” (Morrison, 1964), 
suggesting that pirate radio was supported by those seeking to stay beyond British laws such as 
the Sale of Goods Act and Merchandise Marks Act, although he raised no evidence to support this 
assertion.  Similarly, he gave no evidence for his claim that pirate radio stations “ignore laws 
concerning obscenity, sedition and defamation” (Morrison, 1964). 
Although Radio Caroline was not a threat to the BBC’s revenue stream, it make a mockery of the 
Needletime Agreement, which had been strongly supported by the British Government (Venmore-
Rowland, 1967) and which impacted on the BBC’s cost management since it required the BBC to 
bear the significant cost of employing professional musicians so it could meet the live music quota 
specified in the Needletime Agreement (Wedgwood Benn, 1966). 
Radio Caroline’s success in attracting advertising challenged the British Government’s financial 
competence because the British Government had rejected advertising-funded radio as a model that 
would not be viable financially (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1962).  While pirate 
radio existed, it made the British Government’s support of the BBC anachronistic, suggesting the 
British Government was protecting an organisation that no longer understood public musical taste 
(Wedgwood Benn, 1966).  Clause 3(a) of the BBC’s Charter stated it was “to provide, as public 
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services, sound … broadcasting services … and entertainment for general reception”.  Even 
though the BBC did play some rock music, it did not consider the teenage demographic a separate 
market for programming purposes until forced to recognise the power of the teenage market by the 
popularity of pirate stations, which played rock music exclusively (Lago et al., 2008).  To the British 
media and public, the BBC was viewed as representing the establishment and akin to the British 
Government; they were not separated in the public eye despite the legal independence given the 
BBC by its founding charter (Childs, 2006; Briggs, 1985).  The Beatles’ guitarist George Harrison 
summed up public feeling in the following words: 
I can't understand the government's attitude over the pirates. Why don't they make the BBC 
illegal as well - it doesn't give the public the service it wants, otherwise the pirates wouldn't be 
here to fill the gap. The government makes me sick. This is becoming a police state. They 
should leave the pirates alone. At least they've had a go, which is more than the BBC has done 
(Coleman, 1966). 
The Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 and financial control  
(Radio) Caroline ‘addicts’ … are predominantly young people, half of them being teenagers and 
over 70% of them under 30 years of age. Addiction to Caroline is uncommon amongst 30-50 
year-olds and very rare indeed amongst people over 50 … Addicts’ are found at all levels of the 
social scale, though rather less commonly at the ‘top’... They tend to be less choosey (sic) than 
the average listener and much less interested in hearing programmes that ‘give you something 
to think about’.  Finally being for the most part young people, they are frequently familiar with 
what their friends listen to (and thus open to being influenced by them) … Caroline has quite 
clearly built up its audiences by catering for that substantial section of the public – mostly 
youngsters – who want a continuous stream of Pop … Caroline ‘addicts’, understandably, would 
be very upset if it went off the air … Few of the general public want Caroline to stop, most of 
them are simply indifferent to its fate (The National Archives (UK), 1964/2016). 
The pejorative language in the quotation given above typifies the British Government’s attitude to 
Radio Caroline and the youth demographic of its youth market.  Described as addicts, the report 
constructs Radio Caroline listeners as coming from lower socio-economic groups, unable to make 
a sophisticated listening choice and readily influenced by peer pressure, even though this 
construction was supported in the report by supposition based primarily on surveys of older radio 
listeners who had not listened to Radio Caroline. 
By 1967, legislation had suppressed all pirate radio stations broadcasting into Britain except Radio 
Caroline.  Other stations were located in disused sea forts or structures on islands in the River 
Thames estuary so it was simply a matter of the British government closing legislative loopholes to 
make these locations intra vires.  Being ship-based, Radio Caroline could stay outside British 
territorial limits so was more problematic and its extra-territorial location meant that its broadcasts 
into Britain were not illegal under British broadcasting law.  To stop Radio Caroline’s broadcasts, 
the British government enacted the Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967.  In this 
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section we examine the financial control mechanisms in that legislation.  After its enactment, there 
was such a flood of public protest (Yates, 2003; O'Meara, 2006) that the British Prime Minister 
received more letters per week supporting pirate radio than his combined correspondence received 
on all other political issues (Edwards, 1966).  Central to the legislation was its regime of draconian 
financial control, aimed at preventing Radio Caroline from broadcasting. 
The stated purpose of the legislation was to suppress radio program broadcasts into Britain from 
ships to ensure maritime safety even though Radio Caroline was the only broadcaster in this 
category.  Section 1(1) of the legislation made it an offence to broadcast into Britain from a ship 
outside territorial waters.  This section may have been ultra vires but was not tested in the courts.  
Radio Caroline’s response was to move operations to the Netherlands to be beyond British legal 
reach and within the territorial waters of the Netherlands (Noakes, 1984).  Under sections 3 and 3A 
of the legislation, it was illegal for British subjects to work in any capacity on a ship on the high 
seas engaged in radio broadcasting.  It was illegal to work for a ship that supplied a ship used for 
broadcasting, or to supply a ship if the supplier knew or had reason to believe that the ship had 
broadcasting transmission equipment or was engaged in broadcasting into Britain.  Those 
supplying, maintaining or installing broadcasting equipment or supplying goods for the sustenance 
or comfort of those on ships engaged in broadcasting into Britain were liable to imprisonment and a 
fine.  Radio Caroline circumvented these restrictions by using labour from and receiving supplies 
from Continental Europe. 
The most frequently used financial control mechanisms by governments are taxation penalties 
designed to control corporate behaviour (Ogus, 1998; Nordhaus, 2006; Lee et al., 2008).  Extant 
accounting research has recognised other uses of financial mechanisms to control the outcomes of 
government (Bakre, 2008; Foreman and Tyson, 1998; Walker, 2004; Walker, 2008; Walker and 
Carnegie, 2007).  In this case financial control mechanisms were introduced that disrupted Radio 
Caroline’s revenues. Sections 4 and 5(3) legislation made it illegal for businesses to advertise via 
ship-based radio stations, for the British media to promote ship-based radio advertising or for 
British merchants to sell items advertised in ship-based broadcasts. This meant that businesses 
advertising with Radio Caroline had to withdraw their advertising.  Otherwise, they risked 
prosecution, would not be able to advertise their products elsewhere in the British media and would 
not be able to sell any products in Britain that had been advertised in a broadcast by Radio 
Caroline.  These provisions had nothing to do with marine safety and were included to ensure 
Radio Caroline lost its revenue source and was unable to continue business operations.  Radio 
Caroline attempted to continue operations with a new “pay to play” business model.  As a private 
company, Radio Caroline was not a reporting entity so its financial position cannot be accurately 
determined.  Within seven months, Radio Caroline lost both its ships after failing to pay a creditor 
(Radio Caroline, 2011).  Despite purporting to be legislation about marine safety, its main thrust 
was to prevent Radio Caroline earning revenue.  Without advertising, Radio Caroline was no longer 
economically viable.  The legislation used an indirect approach: the controls targeted Radio 
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Caroline’s advertisers rather than Radio Caroline itself.  It introduced financial control mechanisms 
that made it financially unviable for Radio Caroline to maintain its ships with advertising-based 
model.  Within seven months of the legislation being promulgated, both Radio Caroline ships were 
towed away by a salvage company when Radio Caroline failed to pay a creditor £30,000 
(Chapman, 1992).  The use of financial control mechanisms by the British Government was 
intended to place Radio Caroline in financial distress (Venmore-Rowland, 1967).  The British 
Government could not legislate to close Radio Caroline but it could legislate to create 
circumstances whereby financial failure and subsequent closure occurred in swift succession. 
The British government openly acknowledged that the legislation targeted Radio Caroline 
(Aberdare, 1964).  In Parliamentary debate, the British Government had discussed the possibility of 
jamming Radio Caroline broadcasts but decided a legislative approach would be less expensive 
(Aberdare, 1964).  Although the legislation was presented as important for maritime safety, there 
was no evidence that Radio Caroline’s operations posed a threat to maritime safety.  First, the 
British Government said pirate stations were illegal, which was untrue.  At no time did Radio 
Caroline operate illegally (Aberdare, 1964).  Second, the Government said Radio Caroline used 
frequencies allocated to radio stations in Continental Europe (Aberdare, 1964).  This was also 
untrue.  It used frequencies reserved for ships at sea.  Third, the British Government said Radio 
Caroline’s broadcasts might interfere with reception of an emergency shipping message (Aberdare, 
1964).  This was also untrue as special frequencies are reserved for emergency shipping 
broadcasts to ensure they are always monitored (Edwards, 1966). When these reasons were 
challenged by the media, the British Government stated Radio Caroline’s closure would benefit the 
recording industry because, unlike the BBC, it was avoiding paying royalties for playing of recorded 
music (Wilson, 1971; Hickson and Seldon, 2004).  This was also untrue.  The BBC was legislatively 
exempt from paying royalties.  Although Radio Caroline was not legally required to pay royalties for 
playing recorded music because of its extra-territoriality, it voluntarily paid one per cent of its 
revenues as royalties in accordance with the Copyright Act (UK) 1911.  Radio Caroline had offered 
to make regular payments to the Musicians’ Union but its offer had been rejected (Sorensen, 
1964).  Radio Caroline’s policy was to encourage record sales through on-air promotion of artists 
thereby benefiting the recording industry and artists unable to get airplay because of BBC policies 
and the Needletime Agreement.  Hence, Radio Caroline helped the record industry grow whereas 
the BBC and Musicians’ Union, through the Needletime Agreement, were suppressing that growth. 
It is apparent from Parliamentary debate that the music played by pirate stations represented the 
unacceptable side of the rising youth culture.  It is described as “mush” (Jenkins, 1966) and 
disbelief is expressed that radio listeners would choose to listen to this “audible wallpaper” 
(Wedgwood Benn, 1966). 
The British Government viewed financial control as the only effective way to suppress Radio 
Caroline (Sorensen, 1964; Wedgwood Benn, 1966).  The British Government recognised that “ if 
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British firms could not advertise through the (pirate radio) stations, much of the “pirates” source of 
revenue would, of course, be cut off” (Newton, 1964).  In suppressing Radio Caroline, there were 
elements in Parliamentary debates of the British Government both saving the British public from 
mediocrity, as expressed in its listening choices, and maintaining the fine British spirit that it 
considered to have been so carefully nurtured by BBC programming choices: 
I am not one of those who say that “pop” music should not be played ... Nor am I against these 
chaps with long hair, who seem to cause the most exciting emotions among the girls – and I am 
not jealous, I am beyond the age of jealousy … But why should we have “pop” music pushed 
down or throats, or rather into our ears …. (A)nybody who says – and this is the implication – 
that the general run of the British people … has not got a soul above “pop” radio and “pop” 
music at any hour of the day or night, is wickedly slandering the British people … One of the 
greatest achievements of the British Broadcasting Corporation was in the war years – and they 
did a little immediately before -  in putting on first-class concerts of music which enormously 
improved the British taste for good music (Morrison, 1964). 
The altruism of this argument and other blame avoiding strategies of the British Government are 
examined in the following section.  As Lord Denham (1967) stated when introducing the Marine & 
Broadcasting (Offences) Bill into Parliament: 
If there were not this demand (for rock music) the listeners would not listen, the advertisers 
would therefore not advertise, being a pirate would cease to be financially attractive, and there 
would be no need for this Bill. 
The Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 and blame avoidance 
In this section we examine how the legislation simultaneously helped the British Government to 
avoid blame while establishing the financial control framework that impacted adversely on Radio 
Caroline.  The Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 was predicated on a rhetoric of 
paternalism that constructed Radio Caroline as irresponsible and hence unconcerned with maritime 
safety.  Radio Caroline contributed to this image by broadcasting ship-board antics more commonly 
associated with pre-pubescent school-boys.  The British media contributed to this image by 
selectively reporting the more colourful events aboard Radio Caroline, presenting a discourse to 
the public that focused on the irresponsibility of youth rather than the entrepreneurial business spirit 
that underpinned pirate radio (Humphries, 2003; Lodge, 2002; Radio Caroline, 2011; Aberdare, 
1964).  When well-publicised visits to the ships by fans to view and participate in the excesses of 
life on board ship was evidence to the British Government of the subversive and abandoned 
lifestyle that was part and parcel of rock music and the decadence it represented (Johns, 2010).  
The limited and ambiguous picture entering public discourse divided public opinion, laying the 
groundwork for suppression of pirate radio by the government.  Dividing public opinion has long 
been a tool usable by the those seeking to enforce hegemonic control (Lears, 1985). 
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Although the British Government used the antics on Radio Caroline to cast it as the irresponsible 
child with the British Government becoming the chastising parent, the popularity of Radio Caroline 
made it unwise politically for the British Government to attempt direct means of suppressing the 
station.  There were also cost concerns; both jamming Radio Caroline frequencies and the use of 
Naval gunships were rejected as too expensive (Jenkins, 1966; Aberdare, 1964).  Although not 
discussed in Parliament, the use of Navy power against an unarmed pirate radio ship might not 
have been the most politically astute action.  Weaver (1986) recognised that language is a tool of 
blame avoidance.  Sometimes blame avoidance is evident in what is said but at other times, it 
becomes evident from analysing what is not said.  Parliamentary debate changes after the British 
Government chose a legislative approach to stop Radio Caroline broadcasting.  Instead of 
discussing the problem of pirate radio, the focus shifts to the cost saving of a legislative approach 
to marine safety.  This is a subtle form of blame avoidance by avoiding language that gives visibility 
to the issue.  One of the strategies of blame avoidance identified by Hood (2010), presentational 
strategies, includes stage management to shape public impression.  Avoiding any discussion of the 
financial consequences for Radio Caroline of the legislation gave the appearance of a responsible 
Government focused on marine safety.  In shifting the issue from pirate radio to marine safety, the 
British Government attempted to give legitimacy to its actions by changing societal perceptions 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1993).  The importance of maritime safety was a 
motherhood statement against which it was difficult to argue.  Changing the debate allowed the 
British Government to claim its legislation met a broader national concern for marine safety even 
though there had been no indication that marine safety had been a problem, and no evidence that 
Radio Caroline’s broadcasts threatened maritime safety.   
The British Government used an agency strategy (Hood, 2010), blurring lines of responsibility for 
breaches of the legislation.  Lines of responsibility under the legislation were not specified and 
unclear.  The Postmaster-General had ministerial responsibility for all British legislation pertaining 
to broadcasting.  The Minister of Transport was responsible for all matters of transportation 
including maritime transportation.  The Ministry of Defence was responsible for breaches of 
maritime law that required intervention at sea.  There were no prosecutions under the legislation so 
the unclear responsibilities were not tested.  However, since the essence of the legislation was to 
prevent Radio Caroline earning revenue, rather than prosecute breaches of marine safety, the lack 
of clarity was not an issue. 
While the British Government was drafting the legislation, it asked the BBC to establish a new 
popular music radio station that would replace pirate radio (Wedgwood Benn, 1966).  The British 
Government recognised the BBC’s opposition to an advertising-based funding model and 
programming that differed from its traditional format of “a balanced diet of music, news and spoken 
word, mixed in the proportion thought right for that particular type of listener” would be problematic 
(Wedgwood Benn, 1966).  At the same time the British Government promulgated the legislation, 
the Postmaster-General announced the BBC would start an “official pop music” radio station 
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(Denham, 1967).  Originally called Radio 247 but renamed BBC Radio 1, it was not a direct 
replacement for the continuous rock music of pirate radio.  Instead, it was designed to ”cater for a 
wide(r) range of taste than most of the pirate stations, each of which aims at roughly one section of 
taste” because the British Government decided that “(i)t would clearly be a great waste of our 
broadcasting resources if programmes for a certain section of the population were to dominate the 
broadcasting media at the expense of people who want to listen to other kinds of programmes” 
(Short, 1967).   
Pirate stations had shown by the size of their listening audience that there was sufficient demand 
for rock music on radio.  Despite the comments made in Parliament about the difference between 
pirate radio and BBC Radio 1, the BBC was providing its version of a station for the youth market 
even though its playlist fell far short of the pirate stations’ offerings.  BBC Radio 1 played a 
saccharine and “establishment” version of rock music.  When BBC Radio 1 commenced 
broadcasting on 30 September 1967, it was three months since the three-day Monterey Pop 
Festival, which included performances by Jimi Hendrix, The Mamas and the Papas, Grateful Dead, 
Jefferson Airplane and Janis Joplin (Cox, 2006).  Artists with singles at or near the top of the record 
sales charts included Aretha Franklin, The Rolling Stones, The Small Faces, The Who, Janis 
Joplin, The Beatles and Jimi Hendrix.  The Kinks, The Doors, Eric Burden and the Animals, and 
Martha and the Vandellas had recently released albums (everyHit.com, 2011).  Sergeant Pepper’s 
Lonely Hearts Club Band was the best-selling album and quickly became the iconic album of the 
British invasion (Lodge, 2010).  Procol Harum’s A Whiter Shade of Pale was the best-selling single 
in Britain throughout September.  The BBC chose as its first song Flowers in the Rain by MOVE, a 
light folk-pop song with no hint of youth rebellion: 
Woke up one morning half asleep 
With all my blankets in a heap 
And yellow roses scattered all around 
The time was still approaching 
For I couldn't stand it anymore 
Some marigolds upon my eiderdown  
 
Chorus:  
I'm just sitting watching flowers in the rain 
Feel the power of the rain making the garden grow 
I'm just sitting watching flowers in the rain 
Feel the power of the rain keeping me good (Wood, 1967). 
The many unfortunate programming choices of BBC Radio 1 cannot be attributed to the BBC’s lack 
of experience with the youth market since the BBC had played some rock music before BBC Radio 
1 was established, and most BBC Radio 1 presenters had been working for pirate radio stations so 
could have been expected to know current youth music tastes.  BBC Radio 1 was also subject to 
the Needletime Agreement, which influenced the music played.  For instance, Bernard Herman and 
his Orchestra played BBC Radio 1’s version of Hendrix’s Purple Haze (Davies, 2009).   
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Rebellion and the richness and diversity in British youth culture were reflected in British rock music 
of the 1960s but not in BBC Radio 1’s programming choices (Donnelly, 2005).  BBC Radio 1 
presenters were required to play a broad range of music as deemed suitable for the public by BBC 
programmers, interspersed with rock music (Davies, 1999).  The majority of BBC Radio 1 
programming was taken directly from its “easy listening” radio station, BBC’s Light Programme, 
including religious and classical music offerings.  Although BBC Radio 1 was promoted as the 
station representing youth culture, it only permitted aspects of youth culture it viewed as consistent 
with a carefully sanitised BBC-constructed version of British culture. 
By encouraging the BBC to establish BBC Radio 1 and announcing the new BBC station in 
Parliament on the day the legislation was promulgated, the British Government was avoiding blame 
for the financial distress it would cause Radio Caroline and the expected loss of Radio Caroline 
broadcasts from the radio airwaves by providing a substitute, albeit a watered-down one.  This 
deflected blame for the legislative scapegoating of Radio Caroline by offering a replacement 
sufficiently similar to be acceptable to the public but sufficiently “establishment” to meet the 
Government’s concern that youth culture was deleterious to society (Wedgwood Benn, 1966).  
Both legislation to close Radio Caroline and the establishment of BBC Radio 1 were presented by 
the Postmaster-General as meeting what the Government and the public demanded (Short, 1967) 
even though there was no evidence of public dissatisfaction with Radio Caroline.  When the 
legislation was promulgated, there were public protests to express dissatisfaction about the 
targeting of Radio Caroline. 
The Opposition Party to the British Government, which supported the introduction into Britain of 
commercial radio, disagreed with the method used by the British Government to close Radio 
Caroline: 
Whether it is in broadcasting, education, transport or steel, the Government’s aim is to eliminate 
competition, restrict choice and to revert to the Freudian streak which regards anything remotely 
commercial or profitable as downright immoral.  But the longer term implications behind the 
(legislation) are that monopoly of broadcasting is evil in its restriction of freedom, is inefficient in 
its failure to exploit new skills and resources, is costly in its administrative bureaucracy and runs 
the real danger of largely failing to provide what the customer really wants (Cordle, 1967). 
Radio Caroline was made a scapegoat by the British Government.  Scapegoating is a subtle form 
of blame avoidance because in placing blame onto a scapegoat, attention is deflected from those 
who are seeking to scapegoat others (Girard, 1982/1986).  Drawing on such diverse fields as 
theological hermeneutics, sociology and literary criticism, Girard (1982/1986) explained that 
mimetic desire causes tension to arise in society.  Mimetic desire is essentially envy that leads to a 
desire to mimic the successful.  As tension grows, the stability, and existence, of a community will 
be threatened.  To restore harmony, communal violence is projected upon a representative target 
chosen as the scapegoat.  The death or expulsion of the scapegoat leads to regeneration of 
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communal peace and restores fractured relationships.  For this process to be effective, the victim 
must not be recognised as an innocent scapegoat but the victim must be portrayed as a 
transgressor who deserves punishment.  This allows the community to accept that sacrificing the 
victim eventually restores peace.  Violence against the scapegoat can take any form, including 
discriminatory treatment if scapegoats can access resources others want to or feel they should be 
able to access.  (Girard, 1982/1986; Fleming, 2004).  Girard observed that in punishing the 
scapegoats in society, others avoid punishment. 
It was through financial measures that the British Government made Radio Caroline a scapegoat 
for flouting the BBC monopoly of the radio airwaves and reinforcing elements of youth culture that 
the British Government deemed undesirable.  Legislation that prevented Radio Caroline earning 
advertising revenue was a discriminatory violence to punish Radio Caroline.  Radio Caroline had 
been able to access a large listening audience; the British Government considered radio listeners a 
resource that belonged to the BBC.  The careful construction of legislation against marine offences, 
not pirate radio, allowed a portrayal of Radio Caroline as a transgressor.  In offering a diluted form 
of rock radio considered acceptable to a mainstream audience, BBC Radio 1 became the mimetic 
device that allowed the British Government to restore harmony by appearing to sanction a BBC 
rock radio station. 
Although BBC Radio 1 was promoted as the station representing youth culture, it only permitted 
aspects of youth culture it viewed as consistent with a carefully sanitised BBC-constructed version 
of British culture.  Although the Needletime Agreement continued until the 1970s, pirate radio 
stations such as Radio Caroline fundamentally changed British radio.  Subsequently, the BBC 
started timing precisely the live music it played so it could include more recorded music without 
breaching its agreement with the Musicians’ Union, the British Government was soon to discuss 
commercial radio and whether the BBC monopoly should continue, and record industry sales were 
boosted by the increased exposure both on pirate radio and BBC Radio 1 (Venmore-Rowland, 
1967).  It is beyond the scope of this research to consider the extent that these changes came from 
the legislation, as opposed to an inevitable trajectory of social change in Britain.  However it does 
appear that the revenue strictures of the legislation were essential for setting in motion the 
circumstances that replaced pirate radio with BBC Radio 1 and that the legislation was drafted to 
impact adversely on Radio Caroline’s revenue-generating ability while creating a fiction about 
marine safety, a chimera that was an important element of the blame avoidance strategies that 
surrounded the financial scapegoating of Britain’s most popular pirate radio station. 
Conclusion 
The Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 simultaneously provided a financial 
mechanism against Radio Caroline and a blame avoidance mechanism for the British Government.  
Legislation on marine offences is an unusual source for accounting research, but it is the very 
strangeness of this source that shows the potential for public office-holders to apply financial 
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control mechanisms in subtle and unexpected ways that may not be direct, particularly when it is 
serving multiple purposes.  In our example, it serves both financial control and blame avoidance 
purposes that, without examining the financial constraints drafted into the legislation, would not 
have been visible. 
The Marine & Broadcasting (Offences) Act (UK) 1967 was a clever example of legislative drafting.  
No prosecutions occurred under it, but then, this was not the British Government’s intent.  The 
purpose of the legislation was to prevent Radio Caroline broadcasting by cutting off its revenue 
source while ensuring the legislation did not specifically target Radio Caroline in its wording so that 
it would not appear discriminatory, even though it was.  Using financial mechanisms in this indirect 
way illustrates that it is not only through direct financial constraints that governments can control 
and achieve their objectives. 
Drafting the legislation so it purported to ensure maritime safety deflected attention from its real 
purpose, which was to implement financial controls to prevent Radio Caroline earning revenue.  
There was no evidence that Radio Caroline threatened maritime safety: its only threat was to the 
BBC’s monopoly of radio broadcasting and, consequently, to the British Government’s power to 
implement a monopoly over British radio airwaves.   
Announcing the start of BBC Radio 1 at the same time the legislation was promulgated was a 
strategic move by the British Government.  It was also a subtle blame avoidance technique 
because it deflected attention from the scapegoating of Radio Caroline.  Radio Caroline 
represented the undesirable, rebellious side of youth whereas BBC Radio 1 provided an alternative 
to Radio Caroline in that it was a radio station designed for the youth demographic.   The difference 
between Radio Caroline and BBC Radio 1 was that BBC Radio 1 provided a sanitised version of 
youth radio and rock music that was acceptable to the British Government and could be controlled 
by the BBC.   Radio Caroline had not broken British law but it had flouted the British Government’s 
ability to give monopolistic control of radio broadcasting and radio content to the BBC.  BBC Radio 
1 operated from within the radio broadcasting system sanctioned by the British Government. 
Inter-generational conflict was an important aspect of the British Government’s antagonism towards 
pirate radio stations.  In the early to mid 1960s, Parliamentary debates emphasised the link 
between pirate radio stations and aspects of the youth culture that the British Government found 
undesirable and sought to suppress.  In suppressing pirate radio, the British Government sought to 
suppress inter-generational conflict.  In establishing BBC Radio 1, the British Government sought 
to allow a radio station that presented the youth demographic in an acceptable way, which meant a 
way that was not considered a challenge to authority or established social values.  
There is potential for ongoing research into the use of financial control mechanisms to create, 
manage, maintain and suppress inter-generational conflict.  Examining financial disparities 
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between generations may also enhance our understanding of the role of  wealth in society and 
changing power differentials among sub-groups within society. 
In recent years, pirate radio was once again been mentioned in Parliamentary debate in the British 
House of Commons when Radio Caroline sought permission from the British Government for a 
digital radio broadcasting licence (Brokenshire, 2009).  Its licence application led to Parliamentary 
reminiscences about the 1960s and pirate radio.  In the glowing light of nostalgia, debate in the 
House of Commons recalled how Radio Caroline was much loved by the British public but failed to 
mention the British Government’s efforts to suppress Radio Caroline.  The Gallo Report, a 
contemporary report on radio broadcasting from the European Union and supported by the British 
Government, went further.  It described pirate radio stations of the 1960s as innovative 
entrepreneurs that prompted Britain to discuss goals for radio broadcasting and issues of air-wave 
freedom (van Oojen, 2010).  In reality, that discussion did not occur in Britain until more than a 
decade after the suppression of Radio Caroline (Johns, 2010). 
Despite the warm fuzzy attitude expressed by contemporary British Governments to 1960s pirate 
radio stations and in particular, Radio Caroline, it is pertinent to note that Radio Caroline has 
recently fought a long and embittered battle to gain a digital radio license from the British 
Government.  Although beyond the scope of this research, a cursory examination of the 
Parliamentary debates suggest they may provide a contemporary example of an attempt at 
financial control liberally sprinkled with Government blame avoidance strategies.  The struggle for a 
digital licence may provide an area of ongoing research into strategies that facilitate Government 
blame avoidance while simultaneously imposing financial control.  Although Radio Caroline’s 
current playlists no longer represent a subversive counterculture, perhaps its recent struggle to 
obtain a digital licence suggests redemption and forgiveness are not as easily won as the nostalgic 
recollections of the British Government might suggest. 
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